Anonymous routing protocol is designed for avoiding from being leaked by nodes during communication in mobile ad hoc networks and insuring the communication route can't be discovered. Whereas most proposed anonymous secure routing protocols known in Ad Hoc networks can't meet anonymity sufficient or apply to hierarchical Ad Hoc networks. In addition, the protocols almost didn't have formal proof. Our mechanism based on ring signature, looking for honest neighbors. The source node set "trap-door" by using the public key of destination. Adopt the on-demand routing protocol to complete this program. This new protocols meet the hierarchical Ad Hoc networks by joining the network identifier. Finally, we adopt the formal proof tool UC(universally composable model) to prove the safety and anonymity of the new protocols.
paper will introduce a new anonymous routing scheme which has three advantages: (1) it can provides not only anonymity to the route from source to destination, but sender anonymity.
(2) it is suitable for hierarchical ad hoc networks. (3) it achieves universally composable security.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Ring Signature. Bender et al. [4] gave a strict definition of the ring signature. Kazuki et al. [5] gave an ideal function of UC security according to the anonymous program to achieve anonymity and unforgeability. They also proved the Bender's protocols meet the UC security.
Gen: Generate signing key pair ( , ) The Hierarchical Ad Hoc Networks Anonymous Routing Scheme probability that Z is able to distinguish between an interaction with A and real parties running protocol π and an interaction with S and dummy parties accessing F in the ideal process is at most a negligible probability. Composition Theorem. Let ρ be a protocol that securely realizes the ideal functionality F, and let π be a protocol in the F-hybrid model. We say that / F   , with the ideal functionality F which is replaced by ρ, UC-realizes π. In particular, if π securely realizes the ideal functionality G in the F-hybrid model, then / F   securely realizes G from scratch.
III. ANONYMOUS ROUTING SCHEME FOR HIERARCHICAL AD HOC NETWORKS

A. Networks of Background
Here, the background of what we study is based on the hierarchical ad hoc networks [7] , Network nodes are divided according multi-frequency approach. Participating in the network nodes can be divided into the cluster head nodes and ordinary nodes. We shall make the following assumptions: 1) A bidirectional link between two mobile nodes within the transmission range can be established 2) Nodes in the networks have enough computing power and decryption operation perform 3) Each node has a unique identity (ID). the source node can get the destination node's ID(if the destination node in the other subgroup, including the network identity(NF)) 4) Each node maintains two tables: one is a local neighborhood table ( Fig. 1 ), another is local route table (Fig. 2 ) whose format is as follows:
Neighbor Address Session Key TTL Fig Neighbor Address: neighbor node's address; Session Key: records its session key between itself and the corresponding neighbor, TTL: time to live, if it hits 0, the table removes. Seq#: a number represents a unique route, it maintains the route freshness, prevent replay attacks. Dest_ID: the identity of the destination for the source or the identity of the source for the destination. Ancestor: records its upstream node's address. Successor: records its downstream node's.
B. Adversary Model
Adversary capabilities can generally be divided into passive or active. Attack's goal is to identify the sender and recipient information. Passive attacks monitoring the network traffic data and analysis information. We consider the adversary which controls several nodes of network but does not have full control over the entire network.
Neigborhood Anonymous Authentication Key Exchange Protocol. Cluster head nodes and ordinary nodes do anonymous authentication key exchage protocol based on introduced ring signature. They want to anonymously authenticate each other, where both Alice and Bob know that they are talking to an authentic peer in the ring without knowing the real identity of their peer. They both choose a random number * q x and * q y  and compute , xP yP (where P is the system parameter), when the authentication succeeds, they record address in their trust neighborhood table and possess a new session key at the end of protocol (See Fig. 3 ). 
C. Key Pre-distribution Phase
We assume an offline security manger (SM) exists for identity check and pre-distribution: 1) G 1 is an additive group of prime order q, G 2 is a multiplicative group with the same order as G 1 and ê : 2) Inter-group anonymous route request When a node want to communicate with the node in the different groups, the source node S will also generate the relevant parameters and add the network identity NF into the ARREQ.
The following  form  as  follows: , #, , , ARREQ RREQ seq NF HopCount Cs   Intermediate nodes will discard the ARREQ packet as long as find NF, which means the destination node is in the other group. After that, change their route tables like intra communication.
When the cluster head node receives the ARREQ, it will know the source node want to communicate with the other node of the other subgroups. Because the system uses a multi-band classification, cluster head node use another frequency to forwards the ARREQ to its neighbor cluster head nodes. After that, it changes its route table.
When the neighbor cluster head node receives the RREQ, it checks NF, if not, forward, otherwise, discard the NF of ARREQ. , #, , ARREQ RREQ seq HopCount Cs   .
In this way, it can find the destination node by intra routing discovery. Intermediate nodes complete their route tables. Finally, it can achieve the inter-group routing node discovery.
E. Route Reverse Phase
Inter-group route and intra-group route reverse both executed as follows. The nodes receive the packet from the neighbor honest nodes and can find its forward nodes by seq#.
Step 1. D randomly select
According to seq# look up its upstream, and appends , which is taken to recover M. Similarly D also can send confidential data to S in the same way.
IV. PROTOCOL ANALYSIS BASED ON UC MODEL
The SI unit for magnetic field strength H is A/m. However, if you wish to use units of T, either refer to magnetic flux density B or magnetic field strength symbolized as µ 0 H. Use the center dot to separate compound units, e.g., "A·m 2 ." The proposed protocol π can be divided into three sub-agreement π 1 ， π 2 ， π 3 . π 1 is the authentication key exchange phase; π 2 is anonymous routing stage; π 3 is the data transfer phase. According to common characteristics, the security of π is equivalent π 1 ， π 2 ， π 3 combination of security.
Lemma 1: The protocol π 1 meet the UC security is based on the ring signature, which can against adaptively chosen message attack.
Proof: [5] reference. Lemma 2: The protocol π 3 meet the UC security.
Proof: On the basis of the protocol π 1 , neighborhood nodes get their MAC session key. Source node and destination node establish session key by select random number a, b and sharing parameters g, which meet the bilinear difficulties in problem solving. So the data transfer is the UC security [8] .
Definition 1: the ideal route request process F ARREQ [9] , F ARREQ execute instruction under the background of the security parameter k, participates 1 ,..., n PP , and adversary S. 
Lemma 3: protocol 2
 is UC anonymous in the F SC [6] hybrid model. Proof: Set the attack A running in the routing request of the F SC model. We construct an attack S of F ARREQ. S runs a simulated A. The purpose of simulation is to prove that the environment Z can't distinguish it interacts with S of F ARREQ or interacts with A in the F SC hybrid model. S simulates F SC .
S maintains two tables: parameter table list, which is used to send ARREQ to A; message list List ARREQ which is used to send message to F ARREQ . When S receives NB A (P i ) ARREQ for the first time, it randomly generated seq#, one-time key pair (E pk , E sk ), and use the destination public key to encryption We define the sequence of mixing machine environment proves that process simulation. The probability that Z is able to distinguish between an interaction with A and real parties running protocol π 2 and an interaction with S and dummy parties accessing F ARREQ is at most a negligible probability.
Hybrid H y0 . It generates key pairs for all honest nodes and execute the protocol π 2 for each node. According the protocol π 2 it can simulate the host nodes interact with A and Z. The interaction output of Z and H y0 is the same with the output of Z in the real-life world. Hybrid H y1 and H y0 is basically the same, the differences is that: if x P Ead 
, N x forwards the packet ARREQ to N i , H y1 gets the route path by decryption ARREQ. If the route was not recorded before, then this path is marked as false path Hybrid H y2 and H y1 is basically the same, the differences is that: upon () and H yl will be undistinguishable. Otherwise, the adversary can declassification the IND-CPA security of public key encryption. Assume challenge nodes N, an optional node N j let (N j , SK j ) = (N, SK N ); challenger generates key-pairs for the other nodes. When execute the mix machine for i+1 times, let challenger public key is E PK , if it can distinguish that means to crack the security of IND-CPA.
The output of Z and H y2 , H y3 interaction is computationally indistinguishable. UC secure channel proves the indistinguishable of the ciphertext, which is generated by different plaintext.
The output of Z and H y3 , H y4 interaction is computationally indistinguishable. The reason is the ideal functionality executes the function of honest nodes in the Hy 3 .
Theorem 1 anonymous routing protocols π can achieve UC security Proof. It is proved by Lemma 1-Lemma 3. Our protocols can provide end-to-end anonymity of a route, sender anonymity, the security of authenticated session key shared. In addition, the protocols suitable for hierarchical ad hoc networks and achieve UC security (Table I) .
V. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORK
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a new anonymous routing based on the anonymous ring signature authentication routing protocol, the protocol is more suitable for large-scale ad hoc network and achieve the sender anonymity, routing anonymity. At last, we use the UC model to prove the security of this protocol. As the future research, we plan to improve route efficiency.
